Piracy, the protection of vital state interests and the false foundations of universal jurisdiction in international law by Garrod, Matthew
1 
 
‘Piracy, the Protection of Vital State Interests and the False Foundations of Universal 
Jurisdiction in International Law’ 
 
MATTHEW GARROD

 
 
Introduction 
 
It is widely asserted by courts and in legal scholarship that, for hundreds of years, universal 
jurisdiction has applied to the crime of piracy.
1
 While there is no internationally codified 
definition of universal jurisdiction, the concept, it has been suggested, permits States under 
international law to prosecute certain crimes that are committed abroad, regardless of any 
nexus with the offence and in the absence of any link provided by other grounds of 
prescriptive jurisdiction recognised by international law.
2
 The rationale for this jurisdiction is 
based upon the supposed ‘heinous’ nature of the alleged conduct, the perpetrators of which 
may be prosecuted by every State in order to protect the ‘vital interests’ or ‘fundamental 
values’ of the international community.3 Given that universal jurisdiction is supposed to have 
had as its foundation, and, indeed, its very legitimacy, the suppression of piracy, it is rather 
surprising that it has not been subject to greater scrutiny. Even commentators who have 
claimed to study the concept have not examined its alleged origins.
4
  
 
The aim of this article is to challenge the alleged historical legal foundations of universality. 
By using a range of primary sources, including the treatises of the so-called ‘founding 
fathers’ of international law, its central argument is that jurisdiction over ‘piracy’ is better 
understood under the protective principle, which arose out of the necessity of maritime 
powers, roughly between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to protect certain of their 
vital interests, not least their overseas trade routes and colonial trade and settlements. The 
protective principle is little understood and has tended to be contested or defined in overly-
narrow terms by courts and in legal scholarship.
5
 While a definition of the protective 
principle has yet to be codified internationally,
6
 the principle permits States under 
international law to give extraterritorial effect to legislation criminalising conduct abroad that 
poses a threat to their vital interests, irrespective of any other nexus with the offence.
7
 The 
article therefore seeks to shed important light on the origins of the protective principle and its 
contemporary scope of application.  
 
2 
 
As will be explained, the rise of the centralised State and the mercantilist system in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made the economic strength of the State, through the 
pursuit of colonial trade, a matter of great importance. The development of jurisdiction was 
shaped not only by the need to protect trade from pirates, whose conduct amounted to the 
waging of unlawful warfare and which could not be attributed to any recognised sovereign, 
but also by the rivalry and war among sovereigns to monopolise the right to navigate the high 
seas and conduct trade; in seeking to safeguard their trade from each other, claims were also 
made to uphold the law of nations and supposedly universal values and, indeed, ‘humanity’ 
itself. As the disruption of navigation and trade on the high seas was treated as a violation 
against the law of nations, and every State was permitted to enforce jurisdiction over ‘pirates’ 
on the high seas, the maritime powers had the widest possible jurisdiction under international 
law to protect their vital interests, without having to provide any jurisdictional nexus with the 
alleged offence. 
 
The article begins by outlining the emergence of the so-called ‘golden age of piracy’, 
spanning roughly between 1670-1730.
8
 Thereafter, it examines the threat by piracy to the 
vital State interests shared by the maritime powers. Part three goes on to explain the 
development of jurisdiction over piracy under the protective principle, while part four 
explores the reasons why the suppression of piracy was, nevertheless, often claimed to be for 
the protection of humanity and in the interest of the law of nations, by examining the 
theoretical foundations of the protective principle in the works of some of the classical 
writers on international law. After having examined the development of jurisdiction over 
piracy in its proper historical context, the article concludes that there is a need to 
reconceptualise jurisdiction as based on the protection of vital State interests that are shared 
by the international community. 
 
The Rise of the ‘Golden Age of Piracy’ 
 
During the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, before the development of large public 
navies, European sovereigns used large numbers of privateers as an instrument for waging 
war.
9
 Sovereigns issued privateering vessels-that is to say, private armed merchantmen-with 
licences called ‘letters of marque’, permitting them to use force in order to capture enemy 
warships and merchant vessels.
10
 Privateers played a vitally important part in war and were 
used, in particular, to weaken the economic and military strength of enemy sovereigns.
11
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After Spain discovered the West Indies and America in the fifteenth century, it claimed, on 
the basis of a Papal donation, sovereignty over the high seas and all territories west of an 
imaginary line off the Azores, in order to exclude potential rival European sovereigns from 
navigating the high seas and developing trade.
12
 Spain treated as ‘pirates’ any but Spanish 
vessels sailing in the West Indies.
13
 Portugal claimed the same to the east of the Azores.
14
 In 
reaction to the vast wealth realised by Spain, not unsurprisingly, France, England and the 
Netherlands rejected this claim of sovereignty and waged war against Spain in the West 
Indies, by licensing privateers to attack its colonial settlements and capture its merchant 
vessels.
15
 The same reaction occurred in the East Indies against Portugal, not least by the 
Netherlands, which, as will be shown, provided the broader context for the publication by 
Grotius of Mare Liberum. 
 
Privateers were used by these sovereigns to force access to colonial trade and to protect their 
own settlements in the West Indies from being destroyed by Spanish naval forces. While 
these sovereigns were formally at peace in Europe, there developed a principle of “no peace 
beyond the line”, that is, the imaginary line claimed by Spain dividing Europe from the New 
World.
16
 Under this principle, there existed ‘beyond the line’ a de facto war throughout much 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The use of privateers was so effective that, by the 
close of the seventeenth century, Spain had been forced to negotiate peace treaties.
17
 
Accordingly, Spain agreed to formally recognise the territories which each rival sovereign 
had occupied in the East and West Indies, as well as Africa and America, on the basis that 
they, in turn, restrained their privateers from attacking Spanish settlements and trade and that 
the subjects of the respective sovereigns refrained from travelling to, and trading with, each 
other’s colonies.  
  
The signing of these treaties, nevertheless, led to the abandonment of “no peace beyond the 
line” in favour of a policy of “trade by diplomacy”.18 It was believed that far greater and 
stable wealth could be accumulated by the development plantation economies, built upon the 
back of African slave labour.
19
 This important political and economic development meant 
that large numbers of privateers employed in the West Indies were no longer needed. On the 
contrary, it was believed that unless privateers were effectively restrained, they endangered 
the peaceful relations among sovereigns and the development of trade. The collapse in this 
formerly reciprocally beneficial relationship led to widespread outbreaks of piracy, as 
privateers, nevertheless, continued to wage unlawful warfare by attacking without licence not 
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only the settlements and trade of Spain, but also that of their former sponsors.
20
 Although the 
waging of war by European sovereigns competing to develop trade caused the problem of 
piracy, it was exacerbated by a series of further colonial trade wars, each of which involved 
the licensing of privateers and, in turn, greater outbreaks of piracy.
21
 Of course, this is not to 
suggest that other, more widespread, outbreaks of non-‘Western’ piracy did not occur in other 
parts of the world, both in earlier and later periods, which had nothing at all to do with 
European colonialism.
22
  
 
The way in which sovereigns used privateers to wage war for the pursuit of colonial trade 
raises important considerations as to the relationship between privateers and pirates under 
international law. Pirates engaged in the exact same conduct as privateers, by using force to 
attack and capture merchant shipping.
23
 The only difference between them under the 
developing code of international law in the seventeenth century was that privateers acted 
under the authority and in the interests of a particular sovereign, and, in return, received that 
sovereign’s protection under the law of war.24 Sovereign authorisation legitimised the acts of 
privateers and made them immune from criminal proceedings by the injured power.
25
 
International law developed around the assumption that only sovereigns had the right to wage 
war, which meant that the resort to force without sovereign authority was considered as an act 
of hostility and unlawful warfare.
26
 Importantly, the demarcation between privateers and 
pirates developed as European sovereigns sought to protect their growing economic interests 
in colonial trade from pirates, on the one hand, and to expand them at the expense of their 
colonial rivals, through the use of privateers, on the other.
27
 The threat from piracy to the 
interests of sovereigns is to which this article will now turn.  
 
The Threat by Piracy to Vital State Interests 
 
The rise of the centralised State and the mercantile system in Europe during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries made the economic strength of the State a matter of great importance.
28
 
It should be noted that the concept of the ‘State’ in this period was the person of the 
sovereign, who enjoyed absolute political and economic power over a relatively well-defined 
territory.
29
 Under mercantilist doctrine, the sovereign’s joint objectives were to increase his 
own wealth and power, relative to that of all others.
30
 To that end, mercantilism placed stress 
on the development, monopoly and protection by the sovereign of colonial trade.
31
 This was 
based on the idea that trade produced wealth, which was an essential means to power, 
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including prestige, honour and respect; in turn, power was essential for securing the State 
from external attack, but also for securing access to overseas trade routes and protecting 
colonial trade.
32
 Unsurprisingly, trade was a major source of competition and war among 
European sovereigns. One of the ways in which sovereigns pursued colonial trade was 
through chartered mercantile companies. Private wealthy investors funded these companies, 
and sovereigns, for a share of their profits, granted them trade monopolies and gave them 
quasi-sovereign powers, including the right to build forts and even wage war, for example, by 
licensing privateers.
33
 Sovereigns were also prepared to protect by force the freedom of their 
companies to navigate the high seas and develop trade “against all and everybody in special 
who should hinder and damage them”,34 and, indeed, waged war against each other in order 
to secure the trade of their companies.
35
 The development of economic interests through 
colonial trade was thus of great importance to the State, and it drove both the emergence and 
the expansion of European empires.
36
 
 
The importance of trade, and, indeed, the right of sovereigns to wage war in order to pursue 
and protect it was recognised in the early treatises of modern international law. Molloy 
suggested that “Trade and Commerce are now become the only Object and Care of all 
Princes”;37 it provided sovereigns with the wealth for “fortifying their Countries with 
Reputation and Strength”.38 For Grotius, colonial trade was the sovereign’s “sole source of 
support, renown, and protection”.39 As will be shown, Grotius’s celebrated treatise on Mare 
Liberum, which formed part of a wider unpublished work, was a defence of the waging of 
war by the Dutch East India Company against Portugal in the East Indies, in order to gain 
access to, and eventually monopolise for itself, the lucrative trade in that region. Vattel 
regarded trade as vital for the State’s wealth, strength and security.40 These treatises will be 
returned to below.  
 
Pirates posed a serious threat to the authority and certain vital interests of sovereigns and 
considered themselves as “free princes”,41 “autonomous sovereigns”42 and the “Lords of the 
Sea”.43 Pirates not only claimed to be sovereigns, but also practiced its prerogatives, by 
waging war against colonial settlements. Colonial governors in the West Indies and North 
America reported that their coasts were “infested with pirates” and of being in a “continual 
state of war”.44 Piracy was the antithesis of mercantilism; it created insecurity for vital trade 
routes and threatened to destroy trade across the West Indies and America, Africa and the 
East Indies.
45
 The governor of Virginia reported that pirates “doth ruin trade ten times worse 
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than a war”.46 The threat to trade is perhaps illustrated no clearer than by the torrent of 
petitions by colonial governors and merchants to the British Government and the King for an 
increase in the number and strength of naval warships to protect their trade.
47
 Trade could not 
leave plantations without convoy by naval warships, which would otherwise be left “at the 
mercy of the pyrates”.48 In the Tryals of Eight, the King’s Advocate asserted that “English 
Trade is in the utmost danger at present in America from the prodigious Number of Ships 
exercised in Piracies” and that it threatened to “put a full stop to our Commerce”.49 He also 
asserted that the threat to trade was “Destructive of Government” and “in Violation of the 
Rights of Nations”.50 This signifies the importance of trade to the State and denotes that only 
sovereigns had the right to wage war by disrupting enemy trade.
51
  
 
The Development of Jurisdiction over Piracy under the Protective Principle 
 
It has been widely suggested by courts and in legal scholarship that piracy was suppressed 
during the ‘golden age’ on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and that the rationale for this 
principle was based upon the supposed ‘heinous’ nature of the alleged conduct.52 This view 
has been adopted uncritically; it is based on tentative, secondary sources, or else primary 
sources which have been interpreted wholly out of context. This is illustrated by the 
following example. Scharf has boldly asserted that “[f]or 500 years, States have exercised 
[universal] jurisdiction over piratical acts on the high seas”.53 The only evidence cited by 
Scharf in support is the work of Randall. Unlike the majority of courts and commentators, 
who have done little by way of historical research, Randall did cite a single case to support 
his argument that piracy was subject to universal jurisdiction because it constituted 
“particularly heinous and wicked acts”.54 However, Randall cited only half of the court’s 
reasoning in that case and misinterpreted jurisdiction. The court in that case did not recognise 
the existence of universal jurisdiction and declared piracy to be “heinous and wicked” 
because it was “destructive of all trade and commerce between nation and nations”, namely, 
between England and its colonies.
55
 The court proceeded to assert that it was “the interest of 
all sovereign Princes” to suppress piracy for the protection of their trade. The King’s 
Advocate in that case also described piracy as “odious and horrid” because it threatened trade 
in America, which “is no small advantage to the crown of Great Britain”, and asserted that “if 
no stop be put to those depredations, and our trade no better protected, not only Carolina, but 
all the English plantations in America will be totally ruined in a very short time.”56 Thus, 
pirates had to be suppressed, according to the King’s Advocate, for “the preservation of our 
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trade”.57 There are several other cases in which piracy is declared to be heinous because it 
threatened trade.
58
 It seems to be the disruption of a sovereign’s flag vessels and the threat to 
trade by persons acting without sovereign authority that pirates were sometimes also called 
“hostes humani generis” and “beasts of prey”.59 It is important not to place too much weight 
on the use of these euphemistic labels, none of which were interpreted by courts as permitting 
universal jurisdiction or given any legal meaning in national laws.
60
    
 
The description of acts of piracy as being ‘heinous’ has nothing to do with universal 
jurisdiction; accordingly, it is incapable of providing a theoretical basis for universality.
61
 
Given that the disruption of a sovereign’s navigation and trade on the high seas was not only 
a “hostile” act, but also a method of “lawful warfare” when committed by another 
sovereign’s licensed privateers, it should be of little surprise that the same acts, when 
committed by ‘pirates’, that is to say, persons acting without a valid licence, were condemned 
in the strongest terms and called ‘enemies’.62 The lack of sovereign authority explains the 
reason why these condemnatory labels were not generally attached to privateers, which 
engaged in the exact same conduct as pirates. It may even be the case that such labels were 
used in the endeavour to distinguish pirates from privateers.
63
 As the two practices are 
distinguishable only in nomine and with regard to State sanction, it is illogical to say that, as a 
matter of international law, one of them gave rise to universal jurisdiction because it is 
‘heinous’, while the other was lawful and honourable.64 It is perhaps for this reason that even 
some of the most ardent proponents of universal jurisdiction have rejected the ‘heinous’ 
rationale.
65
 These and other commentators have either not been able to find any other 
rationale to support the development of universal jurisdiction over piracy, or have argued 
instead that universal jurisdiction developed as other ‘traditional’ grounds of jurisdiction did 
not cover piracy.
66
 This view is not only simplistic, but it assumes that sovereigns had the 
willingness and capacity to protect each other’s trade, which is unsupported by primary 
sources. Perhaps more importantly, it does not give sufficient consideration to the 
development of jurisdiction under the theory of protection, and appears to misinterpret the 
protection of vital State interests that are shared by the international community, and calls it 
by a different name, as universal jurisdiction. The idea that grounds of jurisdiction other than 
universality did not cover piracy seems to be based on a misreading of the work of Grotius, 
discussed below.
67
  
 
The locus of piracy on the high seas did not inhibit the maritime powers from establishing 
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jurisdiction to protect their trade, even “in the most remote parts of the world”.68 This is 
illustrated no better than by the municipal law of England governing the trial of pirates during 
the period under focus. In the final years of the seventeenth century, a report by the King’s 
Advocate abruptly brought to the attention of the English Government that the Vice 
Admiralty courts in English colonies did not have under the municipal law of England 
extraterritorial adjudicatory jurisdiction over “offences committed on the high sea”.69 
Moreover, Vice Admiralty courts could not be granted jurisdiction by way of commission to 
try such offences as English law “doth not extend to the Plantations, and so no Commission 
can be granted thither upon that law.” The report concluded, on the other hand, that 
“Governors and Vice-Admirals in the Plantations have sufficient power to fit out ships for 
apprehending of pirates.” The law governing the trial of pirates in England was the ‘Offences 
at Sea Act’ 1536.70 This meant that colonial governors had jurisdiction to capture pirates on 
the high seas, but any persons taken alive had to be transported to England for trial. The law 
was regarded as wholly inadequate to protect expanding trade in the East and West Indies.
71
 
Accordingly, after war had ended with France, in 1700 Parliament enacted the ‘Act for the 
More Effectual Suppression of Piracy’.72 The Preamble to the Act stated that it was intended 
to protect “Trade and Navigation”, particularly in “the East and West Indies, and in Places 
very remote”, from rising numbers of pirates. Section 1 provided that: 
 
all Piracies, Felonies and Robberies committed in or upon the Sea, or in any 
Haven, River, Creek or Place, where the Admiral or Admirals have Power, 
Authority or Jurisdiction, may be examined, inquired of, tried, heard and 
determined, and adjudged, according to the Directions of this Act, in any Place at 
Sea, or upon the Land, in any of his Majesty’s Islands, Plantations, Colonies, 
Dominions, Forts or Factories … by the King’s Commission … or any of the 
Admirals, Vice Admirals, Rear Admirals, Judges or Vice Admiralties, or 
Commanders of Any of his Majesty’s Ships of War [or any other Persons and 
Officers his Majesty shall think fit to appoint].   
   
From the point of jurisdiction, the legislation is significant. It made provision for the Crown 
and Admiralty to issue special commissions for the trial in the King’s colonies of “Piracies, 
Felonies and Robberies committed in or upon the Sea”. The Act also provided for trials to be 
conducted on His Majesty’s Ships of War in “any Place at Sea”. However, this did not mean 
the high seas. To be sure, in 1720 the King’s Advocate issued a legal opinion which stated 
that “pyrates” captured on the high seas may be tried and executed on His Majesty’s Ships of 
War on the coast of plantations, but there was no precedent “for the tryal of pyrats, to be 
executed at any place on the high sea at large”.73 The Act provided for expansive jurisdiction 
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for the more effective protection of England’s trade, and colonial governors in any part of the 
world had authority to hold commissions for the trial of pirates whenever their trade needed 
to be protected. Importantly, there existed no jurisdiction for the trial of pirates other than that 
provided for under English municipal law.
74
 The Act was not concerned with protecting the 
trade of foreign sovereigns and left it lawful for England to licence privateers to attack the 
trade of foreign sovereigns.
75
 Nor did it recognise piracy to be a crime under the law of 
nations or subject to universal jurisdiction, whereby all sovereigns could exercise their 
jurisdiction over any and all ‘pirates’. This reflected the national laws of the other maritime 
powers.
76
 The only provision in national laws for the prosecution of crimes against a foreign 
sovereign were those committed by the prescribing State’s subjects, where such persons 
either acted without or beyond the terms of a privateering licence and attacked the flag vessel 
of an allied, friendly or neutral sovereign, rather than that of an enemy, or else served under 
the privateering licences of a foreign sovereign; both circumstances risked causing reprisals 
and hostilities.
77
 
 
In sum, there is no State practice to support the development of universal jurisdiction over 
piracy during the ‘golden age’.78 Rather, jurisdiction developed out of the necessity by States 
to secure their vital trade routes and protect colonial trade and settlements from unlicensed 
privateers, whose acts of unlawful warfare could not be attributed to any sovereign.
79
 
 
Notwithstanding the development of protective jurisdiction over piracy, in some pirate trials 
courts not only described pirates as the “enemy of all mankind” but also claimed that piracy 
is “a crime against the law of nations”, which is suppressed to protect “humanity” and to 
“preserve Mankind”.80 In turn, jurisdiction over piracy appears neutral and objective, based 
on the protection of higher, supposedly ‘universal’ values. However, this is misleading. The 
‘pirates’ of one sovereign were not the pirates of each and every sovereign everywhere;81 
States also tolerated and even colluded with ‘pirates’.82 British and Spanish colonial 
governors accused each other to be in “Breach of the Law of Nations” for harbouring 
‘pirates’ who had committed attacks against their own trade.83 It is therefore not credible to 
say that ‘pirates’ were the enemy of mankind and punished for mankind; rather, pirates were 
the enemies of the State that labelled persons as such. Nevertheless, it is this rhetoric upon 
which subsequent courts and commentators have focused and misinterpreted jurisdiction as 
based upon universality.
84
 In order to better understand why the disruption by pirates of 
navigation and trade on the high seas was claimed to violate the law of nations, and were 
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suppressed in the interest of mankind, it is useful to examine some of the early treatises on 
international law. 
 
Theoretical Foundations of Protective Jurisdiction under International Law  
 
One of the most influential writers on modern international law was Hugo Grotius. The most 
pressing issue for Grotius in the early seventeenth century was the right of the Dutch to freely 
navigate and conduct trade on the high seas to the East Indies, which was threatened not by 
‘piracy’, but, rather, by Portugal, which had since the late fifteenth century claimed 
sovereignty over the high seas and all territories in that region in order to monopolise 
European trade. Complicating matters, Portugal had been ruled by the King of Spain since 
1580, and the Dutch Republic had been involved in a war of independence against Spain 
since 1568, which was treated as a rebellious region of the Spanish empire.  
 
In 1603, the Dutch East India Company captured a Portuguese ship, the Santa Catarina in the 
Straits of Singapore, which was carrying precious metals at a value of over three million 
guilders.
85
 Grotius was retained by the Dutch Company in 1604 to write a legal treatise 
defending the capture and acquisition of the Santa Catarina as lawful prize. The broader 
legal and political context of Grotius’s work was to justify the waging of war by the Dutch 
Republic against Spain and Portugal in the East Indies, as Grotius put it, in the “zeal for 
commerce and for enterprise in foreign lands”.86Against this contextual backdrop, Grotius 
prepared a manuscript, “Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty”.87 This text was not 
published until the nineteenth century, but Chapter XII of this work was published separately 
and anonymously by Grotius at the request of the Dutch Company in 1609, entitled “Freedom 
of the Seas or the Right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in East Indian Trade” (Mare 
Liberum).
88
  
 
According to Grotius, “the right to engage in commerce pertains equally to all peoples.”89 
Grotius believed that “humanity is united” by trade and that trade is a “necessity” for the 
“human race”.90 Thus, the prevention of trade is an offence against “nature herself”91 and 
“must constitute an injury”.92 In order to justify the Dutch Company, as a private actor, 
waging war against the subjects of a foreign sovereign, Grotius argued that in a state of 
nature, such as on the high seas, where judicial recourse is lacking, private individuals and 
sovereigns share the same powers under the fundamental “precepts” of the law of nature: 
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self-defence and the protection of trade.
93
 The prevention of Dutch trade was, moreover, not 
merely an attack against the Dutch, but an injury to the “human race”.94 In turn, Grotius could 
portray the Dutch Company and the Dutch Republic as waging war to open up overseas trade 
routes and to punish the Portuguese in the interest of the law of nature and for the “benefit of 
humanity” itself.95  
 
Apart from arguing that the freedom of trade is an “incontrovertible right” protected by 
natural law, Grotius went further by arguing that the law of nations established the following 
“foundational” rule: “the right to engage in commerce pertains equally to all peoples, and no 
state or prince has the power to issue a general prohibition forbidding others to enjoy 
access”.96 Thus, asserted Grotius, “access to all nations is open to all, not merely by the 
permission of the law of nations but by the command of the law of nations.”97 In order to 
prevent the Dutch Company from accessing trade routes, Portugal would have to demonstrate 
that it had established sovereignty, and therefore ownership, over the high seas, which are 
“immense” and “infinite”.98 There are some things, argued Grotius, which belong to nature 
and are “impossible” to possess privately, including air, fish and the sea.99 Just as Spain and 
Portugal had claimed sovereignty over the high seas under the authority of Papal decree, 
which Grotius rejected as the Pope did not have such authority,
100
 Grotius buttressed his 
argument with higher, binding authority - the law of nations. As the disruption of trade 
violated the law of nations, sovereigns - and more particularly the Dutch - were permitted to 
punish foreign nationals and even use military force in a “just war” in order to protect their 
navigation and trade under the authority and in the interest of the law of nations.  
 
Mare Liberum meant that no sovereign could lawfully claim ownership over vital trade routes 
on the high seas.
101
 According to Grotius, “if princes possess a right over the sea, it is merely 
a right of jurisdiction and protection”.102 This was made clear by Grotius in a subsequent 
manuscript in defence of Mare Liberum, where Grotius asserted that, as the seas cannot be 
“occupied” through claims of sovereignty, “[a]ll peoples or their princes in common can 
punish pirates and others, who commit delicts on the sea against the law of nations.”103 
Grotius seems to have made a fundamental distinction between the “common” right of 
sovereigns to punish disruption to their navigation and trade, as violations against the law of 
nations, and universal jurisdiction.
104
 Nevertheless, in accordance with the thesis in De Jure 
Praedae, Grotius went on to conclude that “if a prince has real jurisdiction over the sea and 
indeed the Ocean, this would not have anything to do with his claiming ownership of the sea, 
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but with his guarding its community”.105    
 
Grotius discussed piracy only to the extent of accusing the Portuguese as being ‘pirates’ for 
preventing Dutch trade to the Indies, which was “harmful to all mankind” and therefore 
justified the Dutch in “inflicting punishment on them”.106 For Grotius, ‘piracy’ was little 
more than a label attached by sovereigns to persons that “blockade the high seas and impede 
the progress of international commerce”, which violated the law of nations.107 It was thus 
perfectly just for the Dutch Company to wage war against the Portuguese, as violators of the 
law of nations, and to punish them by attacking and seizing the Santa Catarina and its cargo.   
 
Grotius later developed his argument in “On the Law of War and Peace”, which was 
published in 1625. In this later work Grotius asserted that: 
 
Kings … have a Right to exact Punishments [on foreign nationals], not only for 
Injures committed against themselves, or their Subjects, but likewise, for those 
which do not particularly concern them, but which are, in any Persons whatsoever, 
grievous Violations of the Law of Nature or Nations.
108
 
 
Grotius included within this statement the right to punish ‘pirates’. Though Grotius did not 
discuss piracy in any meaningful way, he did suggest that wars are justly waged against 
pirates as offenders of the law of nature and the law of nations.
109
 While some courts and 
commentators have interpreted the above, obscure, passage as “the modern theory of 
universal jurisdiction” over piracy,110 others have argued that it is a general theory of 
universal jurisdiction, not specifically relating to piracy.
111
 However, neither interpretation 
seems accurate. Rather, the statement has to be set within the context that Grotius first 
developed his argument in Mare Liberum and the ‘universal’ right of every sovereign to 
punish violators of the law of nations, including by labelling such persons as ‘pirates’, 
without having to prove “Injuries committed against themselves”. Elsewhere, Grotius 
asserted that sovereigns are “permitted by the Law of Nations” to grant “Commissions to 
People going to Sea, to attack Pirates wherever they meet them”.112 The reason that 
sovereigns granted such commissions was for the protection of their navigation and trade.
113
 
It also has to be borne in mind that the right of “Kings” to exact punishment, to which 
Grotius referred, belonged to European sovereigns, who were able to punish their enemies, 
not least those in the colonial world, as ‘pirates’ and violators of the law of nations. 
 
Grotius’s argument for Mare Liberum was not made in a legal vacuum, and it is not that 
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different to the Spanish theorist of international law, Francisco de Vitoria, who had argued in 
the previous century for the right of the Spanish sovereign under the law of nations to wage 
war in self-defence and to punish American Indians for opposing the freedom of Spanish 
trade.
114
 Writing in the late sixteenth century, Gentili shared the view that Spain had justly 
waged war against the Indians for refusing to trade with them.
115
 Gentili was the first modern 
jurist to discuss piracy under the law of nations, although his argument was framed within the 
context of the law of war and seems to have been implicitly made, at least in part, in response 
to attacks committed against Spanish colonial trade in the Mediterranean by the so-called 
‘Barbary’ States of North Africa. With this in mind, Gentili argued that sovereigns are 
permitted under the law of nations to justly wage war against persons who disrupt their 
navigation and trade on the high seas, and that, where such persons act without sovereign 
authority, they may be treated as “brigands or pirates”.116 For Gentili, only sovereigns are 
entitled to wage war under the law of nations, which means that “pirates and robbers”, unlike 
privateers, “do not come under the law of war” and may be destroyed.117 As pirates do not act 
under the authority of sovereigns in a state of war, Gentili defined pirates simply as “the 
common enemies of all mankind”; however, what he appears to have really meant is the 
common enemies of sovereigns, as pirates, according to Gentili, fall outside the law of 
nations, which is an agreement and compact between sovereigns.
118
 Of course, whether an 
offender could be treated as a ‘pirate’ depended upon the recognition of the sovereignty of 
the licensing authority, which was a political rather than legal decision made by the injured 
sovereign. Gentili recognised that the high seas are “common to all” sovereigns under the law 
of nations,
119
 and he argued that it is therefore “right” for all sovereigns to wage war against 
pirates, because “piracy is contrary to the law of nations” and a “violation of the common law 
of humanity and a wrong done to mankind”.120 It seems to have been the disruption of a 
sovereign’s navigation and trade on the high seas by unlicensed privateers in time of peace 
which Gentili considered to violate the law of nations, rather than ‘piracy’ per se. Gentili was 
not detailing the practice of sovereigns at that time, but instead prescribing that sovereigns 
‘should’ wage war against pirates. This was an argument attractive to sovereigns for the 
protection of their navigation and trade; it was also favourable to the Spanish Crown, for 
whom Gentili subsequently worked as an advocate, which was at war with the Dutch 
Republic as well as the Barbary States and treated their privateers as ‘pirates’. Thus, in 
similar terms to the argument made by Grotius, sovereigns are permitted by the law of 
nations to wage war against their enemies as ‘pirates’ and enforce jurisdiction over them on 
the high seas as violators of the law of nations, in order to secure vital trade routes and 
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protect trade. What is more, this could be done in the interest of ‘humanity’.   
 
Grotius was a major influence on Emer de Vattel, writing on the “Law of Nations” in the 
mid-eighteenth century.
121
 Vattel described the law of nations as the law of nature applied to 
the relations of independent sovereigns living in a state of nature.
122
 Vattel made the general 
proposition that the law of nations is “of such importance to the safety of all states” that all 
nations have the right to use “forcible means” for the purpose of repressing any nation that 
tramples it “under foot”.123 Writing more specifically on “the Sea”, a nation that violates the 
law of nations by claiming sovereignty over the high seas, suggested Vattel, “does an injury 
to all nations; it infringes their common right”.124 Although it is not discussed in detail by 
Vattel, the “common right”, to which he referred, includes the right of navigation and trade, 
particularly given that Vattel makes reference to Grotius’s Mare Liberum and the “exceeding 
importance” of trade to the wealth, strength and security of the State.125 The “common 
enemy” claiming sovereignty over the seas may, moreover, be punished by injured States, 
including by the use of military force, in the interest of the law of nations and to “discharge 
their duty” to “human society”.126 As Vattel put it: “Nations have the greatest interest in 
causing the law of nations, which is the basis of their tranquillity, to be universally 
respected.”127  
 
It is within this context that Vattel’s passage on piracy has to be understood:  
 
although the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the 
punishment of crimes committed in its own territories, we ought to except from 
this rule those villains, who, by the nature and habitual frequency of their crimes, 
violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. 
Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated 
wherever they are seized; for they attack and injure all nations, by trampling under 
foot the foundations of their common safety. Thus pirates are sent to the gibbet by 
the first into whose hands they fall.
128
  
  
This passage gives the impression that ‘pirates’ are punished by every State on behalf of all 
nations, and, unsurprisingly, has been cited in support of universal jurisdiction.
129
 On closer 
inspection, the theory of Vattel has nothing to do with universality and is no different from 
that of Grotius. Indeed, ‘pirates’ are, for Vattel, persons that violate the law of nations, by 
disrupting the freedom of navigation and trade on the high seas. The description by Vattel of 
‘pirates’ as the “enemies of the human race” appears little different from Vattel’s description 
of a State claiming sovereignty over the high seas as a “common enemy”. As the law of 
15 
 
nations, in Vattel’s view, provides States with the “foundations of their common safety”, all 
States are permitted, as an exception to the territoriality of jurisdiction, to punish ‘pirates’, to 
protect their “common right” of navigation and trade and “defence and safety”;130 what is 
more, this could be done in the interest of enforcing the law of nations and for the benefit of 
all nations. Given that Vattel treated the law of nations as the law of nature applied to 
sovereigns and, as did Grotius, viewed trade as beneficial to the “human race”,131 and 
therefore suggested that States are under a general obligation to protect and foster trade,
132
 
presumably ‘pirates’, by disrupting navigation and trade, could also be punished for the 
benefit of humanity.
133
  
 
At the heart of these early treatises on international law is the theory of protection, which 
reconciled the protection of navigation and trade with the law of nations and supposedly 
universal principles and, indeed, humanity itself. As navigation and trade were protected by 
the law of nations, no State could claim sovereignty over the high seas and all States were 
permitted, under the authority and in the interest of the law of nations, to enforce jurisdiction 
on the high seas, and even use military force, to secure their vital trade routes and protect 
trade from violators of the law of nations. It is within this intellectual framework that the 
maritime powers legitimised the protection of their navigation and trade, both from each 
other and ‘pirates’, during the ‘golden age’ and beyond.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This article has challenged the common understanding that universal jurisdiction emerged out 
of the suppression of piracy and suggested that jurisdiction instead represents one of the 
earliest and most important developments of the protective principle, the origins of which 
have rarely been examined and are little understood. As the disruption of navigation and trade 
on the high seas was treated by States as a violation against the law of nations and harmful to 
humanity, in order to safeguard their trade from each other during disputes and rivalry, claims 
were also made to suppress ‘pirates’ in the interest of the law of nations and for the benefit of 
humanity. Importantly, as all States were permitted to enforce jurisdiction on the high seas 
over pirates, given that the high seas could not be owned by any one particular sovereign and 
that pirates were deemed to fall outside the protection of any sovereign power, it was 
therefore unnecessary, as a matter of international law, to justify the prescription of national 
laws extraterritorially by providing a nexus with an offence under a particular ground of 
16 
 
jurisdiction.
134
 The upshot of all of this is that each of the maritime powers possessed, in time 
of peace, the widest possible jurisdiction under international law for the protection of their 
vital interests on the high seas, without having to prove any nexus with alleged pirates; at the 
same time, the restriction of jurisdiction to ‘piracy’ protected from interference by each other 
their own sovereign rights of navigation and trade. It should be noted that this broad right of 
protective jurisdiction over piracy, which does not require a jurisdictional nexus between a 
prescribing State and an alleged offence, was eventually codified in the 1982 UN Convention 
for the Law of the Sea.
135
  
 
There is a need, it is submitted, to reconceptualise jurisdiction over piracy as based on the 
protection of vital State interests that are shared by the international community, which has 
been widely misinterpreted by courts and in legal scholarship, and called by a different name, 
as universal jurisdiction. This is due, in large part, to the persistent reliance upon secondary, 
tentative sources, or the citation of primary sources, wholly out of context. Consequently, 
universal jurisdiction is based on false foundations and has been allowed to develop as a 
hollow concept. The implications are twofold. First of all, it raises serious doubts, as a matter 
of international law, as to the validity and legal basis of universality over piracy, the use of 
which has been invoked in recent years by maritime powers seeking to protect their vital 
trade routes and flag vessels off the coast of Somalia and, to that end, has been affirmed by 
the UN Security Council.
136
 Second, universal jurisdiction should not be expanded to 
encompass crimes under international law by analogising them with piracy.
137
 For the reason 
that jurisdiction has traditionally developed over piracy on the high seas under the protective 
principle, the attempts made by a handful of States in recent years to exercise universality 
over crimes other than piracy, allegedly committed in the territory of other States, has given 
rise to inter-State disputes and led to the concept’s validity and scope being the subject of 
heated debate before the UN General Assembly.
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